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I. Introduction
S
tandard neoclassicallabor market models predict that workers
with identical skills will receive the same wage independent of
the industry in which they are employed. To maximize profit,
firms expand employment to the pointwhere the wage rate equals the
value of labor's marginal product. With full information and zero
transaction costs, factor mobility ensures that the wage rates and
simultaneously the marginal products ofworkers with identical abili-
ties are equalized across industries.
Yet, recent empirical evidence from the D.S. labor market casts
doubt on the explanatory power ofthe standard competitive model.
Several studies [Dickens and Katz, 1987a; 1987b; Katz and Sum-
mers, 1989; Krueger and Summers, 1987; 1988] 1 find substantial
interindustry wage differentials for workers with similar individual
characteristics doing apparently similar jobs. The interindustry wage
structureis reported to be remarkably stable overtime, thus ruling out
an explanation ofthe observed wage differentials based on transitory
sectoral demand shifts or a short-run immobility oflabor.
Furthermore, the D.S. interindustry wage structure seems to be
positively correlated with the interindustry wage structures of other
countries like, e.g., West Germany. This internationalsimilarity ofthe
industry wage structures in West Germany and in the D.S. appears to
Remark: We have benefited from helpful comments by seminar participants at the Kiel
Institute ofWorld Economics and by Barbara Kauffmann, Karl-Heinz Paque, Stefan
Sinn and Frank D. Weiss. A shorter version of this article was presented at the 5th
Annual Congress ofthe European Economic Association at Lisboa, Portugal, August
31-September 2, 1990.
1 See Thaler [1989] for a short survey ofthese and related studies.FelsjGundlach: Interindustry Wage Differentials 545
be a puzzle since these countries exhibit totally different labor market
institutions. The results, however, suggest that country-specific insti-
tutional factors maynotpossess a high explanatorypower. To test this
apriori implausible hypothesis properly, we shall try to replicate the
results for the V.S. with data from West Germany in more detail in
this paper.
Incontrast to the studies for the V.S., which are based on individ-
ual survey data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), our anal-
ysis is based on aggregate wage data. Another difference is that our
sampIe ofindustries consists ofmanufacturing plus mining, construc-
tion, and public utilities, whereas the V.S. studies analyze the econo-
my-wide spectrum ofindustries. The high level ofaggregation and the
exclusion ofthe more heterogeneous service sector from the analysis
should bias our results in favor of the acceptance of the law of one
price for workers with identical skills. Therefore, our analysis can be
interpreted as a rather strong test of the hypothesis that the inter-
industry wage structure is similar accross countries since we employ
a totally different set ofdataand onlyinvestigate an(albeit important)
subsector ofthe West German economy.
11. The Evidence
To gain an overall impression ofthe interindustry earnings struc-
ture in West Germany, it is sufficient to limit the analysis to one year
(1986) because the West German interindustry wage hierarchies for
different qualification groups are reported as having been remarkably
stable (correlation coefficients higher than 0.9) since 1970 [Gundlach,
1986].2 Table 1 presents average earnings differentials for blue-collar
and white-collar workers for both men and women.
3 Following these
2 Krueger and Summers [1987, p. 24] find a high correlation of the wage structure in
nine major U.S. industries during the 1900-1984periode For selected years after 1915,
they report correlation coefficients with the wage structure in 1984 ranging from 0.76
to 0.98.
3 The statistical sources for our empirical analysis are the "Arbeiterverdienste in der
Industrie" and the "Angestelltenverdienste in Industrie und Handel" published by the
Statistisches Bundesamt [a; b]. These statistics contain the effective hourly wages for
three qualification groups ofblue-coHar workers (Arbeiterverdienste) and the effective
monthly salaries for four qualification groups ofwhite-collar workers at the two-digit
industry level as weH as employment-weighted average wages and salaries. We concen-
trate our analysis on those industries for which data for all qualification groups are
available for mostoftheyears since 1960 becausewe wantto analyze the widest possible
range of qualification differences across industries. For the exact definitions of the
seven qualification groups see Statistisches Bundesamt [a; b]. In short, we have three546 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
estimates, the petroleum refining and motorvehicle industries pay the
highest wages for all worker groups, while leather industries, foot-
wear, apparel, and precision ceramies pay the lowest wages for all
worker groups. But this high-wagejlow-wage pattern does not hold
uniformly for all industries. For example, in ship building, only blue-
collar workers receive above average earnings, and in precision me-
chanics only female blue-collar workers earn more than the respective
industry average. That is to say, our four worker groups do not
display the same degree ofinterindustry earnings variation.
It is reasonable to expect relatively low interindustry earnings
differentials for relatively homogeneous qualification groups and for
employees with a comparatively high degree of regional mobility.
Alternatively, high interindustry earnings differences are more likely
to be found among the more heterogeneous blue-collar workers of
different industries where ability differences not captured by our set
ofdatamay explainmore ofthevariation thanamong thewhite-collar
workers. Higher interindustry earnings differentials are also more
likely to be found for employees with a relatively low mobility such as
women, especially women with children at horne. Traditionally, a
married couple chooses to live near the working place of the main
income earner, andso far, as a general rule, this has been the husband.
Therefore, women might only be mobile across industries near their
horne which in turn is determined by job opportunities for the hus-
band. Another reason for the lower interindustry mobility ofmarried
women with children at horne can be that in most cases they and not
their husbands take care of the children when they become siek.
Therefore, a relatively short distance between the place ofwork and
the horne might be a further restrietion which can explain interindus-
try wage differentials between men andwomen. Higherwages in more
distant industries, then, are a smaller incentive to change the job for
women than for men.
In general, our findings are consistent with these considerations.
The employment-weighted standard deviation of the interindustry
earnings differences is higher for blue-collar workers than for white-
groups of skilled workers (white-collar workers, groups 2, 3, and 4), one group of
specialized workers (blue-collar workers, group 1), and three groups ofunskilled work-
ers (white-collar workers, group 5, and blue-collar workers, groups 2 and 3). Since all
wages and salaries are published for both men and women we get a total of 14 quasi
different qualification groups. Prom the original data for the months January, April,
July, and October we calculate average wages and salaries for each qualification group
in each industry for selected years. In the remainder ofthe paper the term "eamings"
refers to wages for blue-collar workers and to salaries for white-collar workers.Table 1 - Interindustry Earnings Differentials
for Selected German Industries, 1986 (percent) a
Industry b Men Women
Blue- White- Blue- White-
collar collar collar collar
workers workers workers workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mining 7.5 9.1 - 6.4
Stone and clay -6.7 -6.9 5.3 -5.0
Iron and steel 1.0 -2.5 8.1 -4.0
Nonferrous metals -1.0 -0.8 3.8 -0.2
Chemicals 6.8 4.3 8.4 12.6
Petroleum refining 27.6 25.8 25.2 32.1
Rubber -1.9 -3.2 6.2 0.9
Lumber -14.2 -13.3 -3.9 -18.1
Pulp, paper, paperboard 1.0 8.1 -0.5 2.4
Structural engineering 3.2 2.4 4.4 -2.1
Machinery, exc. electrical 1.6 -0.1 7.1 -3.6
Computer equipment -1.4 13.5 10.4 17.9
Motor vehicles and equipment 10.5 9.0 24.2 8.8
Ship building 4.0 -7.7 13.3 -11.1
Aircraft 8.2 6.6 12.6 7.3
Electrical engineering -3.0 2.9 3.1 3.0
Precision mechanics, optics -4.8 -5.7 3.6 -3.4
Metal products -6.8 -6.2 -1.2 -7.6
Precision ceramics -15.9 -18.7 -6.5 -13.1
Glass -4.0 -9.2 -6.5 -9.5
Furniture -7.1 -12.0 -0.6 -15.9
Musical instruments, toys, jewelry -11.4 -11.7 -7.3 -11.6
Paper and paperboard products -10.3 -7.9 -11.0 -10.5
Printing 9.4 -2.4 10.1 -2.3
Plastics products -9.1 -6.2 -7.4 -8.2
Leather -17.6 -11.3 -9.9 -12.2
Leather products -21.2 -20.1 -18.6 -20.7
Footwear -19.4 -18.1 -10.0 -20.7
Textiles -15.1 -13.6 -6.3 -10.2
Apparel -16.0 -15.4 -11.6 -10.2
Food, beverages, tobacco -8.1 -9.2 -11.1 -4.8
Construction -3.8 -0.2 - -7.9
Public utilities 11.0 -4.3 14.3 3.0
Employment-weighted





C 0.886 0.872 0.808 0.830
in 1939
d 0.815 - - -
a Percentage deviation ofemployment-weighted average wages (salaries) from the
industry average total. - b Classification according to the West German wage and
salary statistics. - C Correlation coefficients with labor-quality adjusted D.S. wage
differentials; 21 observations for columns (1), (2) and (4), 19 observations for
column (3). - d 14 observations.
Source: Krueger and Summers [1988]; Slichter [1950]; Statistisches Bundesamt [a; b];
own calculations.548 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
collar workers and it is higher for wornen thanfor rnen. Thatis to say,
interindustry earnings differentials are srnallest (the standard devia-
tion is 0.219) for the most homogeneous and most mobile employee
group, namely male white-collar workers, and they are highest (the
standard deviation is 0.450) for the most heterogeneous and most
immobile employee group, namely female blue-collar workers. 4
We find a rather strong positive correlation between each of our
(subgroup) earnings structures (columns (1) through (4) in Table 1)
and the labor-quality adjusted U.S. wage structure in 1984 in spite of
ourestimated group-specific differences. 5 Even theV.S. interindustry
wage structure of1939 6 is correlated positively with the West German
interindustry wage structure of1986 (correlation coefficient of0.82).
Our finding seems to confirm the hypothesis that wage structures are
similar across countries independent ofthe time period under consid-
eration. Taken at face value, however, the high correlation coefficient
between the V.S. and the West German interindustry wage structure
as measured by ourfirst ratherbroadconceptis notsufficient to reject
the hypothesis of equal wages for equally qualified workers across
industries in West Germany, especially since our results seem to indi-
cate absolutely smaller interindustry wage differentials than in the
U.S. [Krueger and Summers, 1988, p. 265]. But in contrast to the
methodology used in the recent V.S. studies, we cannot simulta-
neously test for the magnitude and the statistical significance of in-
terindustry wage differentials. Therefore, we try to test for the exis-
tence ofhigh-wage and low-wage industries in West Germany with a
different approach in more detail.
Here we use an F-test to decide whether the wage and salary
structure ofa given industry differs from the average wage and salary
structure ofour sampIe. The test criterion is given by [Maddala, 1977]
F = _(R_R_S_S_-_U_R_SS_)/_(k_+_1_)
URSS/(n1+n2-2k-2)
with RRSS = restricteq sum of squared residuals, URSS=unre-
stricted sum ofsquared residuals, k + 1= number ofparameters, and
n1 , n2= number of observations in different sarnples.
4 For the D.S. the quality adjusted, employment-weighted standard deviation of the
estimated wage differentials reported to be 24 percent [Krueger and Summers, 1987,
p. 21] and 28 percent [Katz and Summers, 1989, p. 219] for 1984.
5 The correlation between wage differentials for a single occupational group, namely
operatives in West Germany and in the D.S. is reported to be as high as 0.95 in 1983
[Katz and Summers, 1989, p. 225].
6 Data are taken from Slichter [1950].Fels/Gundlach: Interindustry Wage Differentials
We run regressions of the form
6
Inw=C+ L Qi+G + U
i=l
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to estimate the squared sum ofresiduals from an analysis ofvariance.
Our observations are the effective monthly wages and the effective
monthly salaries (ln w) of the previously-mentioned 14 qualification
groups, namely three blue-collar worker and four white-collar worker
groups, for men and women, respectively. Q and G are dummy vari-
ables for the different qualification groups (Q) and for women (G).
The regression constant C captures the impact of the (omitted) sev-
enth qualification group (for men), and u denotes the error term. The
procedure to calculate the F-value for each industry involves three
regressions ofthe form described. The first regression which combines
the 14 industry-specific wages and salaries and the 14 average industry
wages and salaries in one sampIe with 28 observations generates the
restricted residual surn ofsquares (RRSS). The unrestricted residual
sum ofsquares (URSS) is estimated from the two sampIes which add
up to the first regression sampIe:the residual sum ofsquares following
from a regression on the 14 average industry wages and salaries is
added to the residual surn ofsquares following from a regression on
the industry-specific wages and salaries.
The critical F-value for 8 parameters and 12 degrees offreedom,
which follows from our sampIe of28 observations and 7 (exogenous)
dummy variables is 2.85 for the 5percent statistical significance level.
That is, a computed F-value higher than 2.85 indicates the inequality
of the coefficients in our two regression sets. With such a result we
reject the null hypothesis ofindifferent wages and salaries for equal
qualifications between the industry under consideration and the com-
puted industry average. With an estimated F-value lower than the
critical F-value we accept the "indifferentwage structure" hypothesis.
The detailed results of the F-test for different years are presented in
Table 2. The general picture ernerges that for West German industries
there is a statistically significant interindustry earnings dispersion for
employees classified within the same qualification group. Recession
years such as 1982 and 1975 seem to have no major impact on this
result, thus ruling out explanations based on cyclical behavior. From
the year 1960 to 1986 the interindustry wage dispersion apparently
grew in terms of the number of industries whose wages and salaries
significantly deviate from the industry average: from 15 industries out550 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
ofa sampIe of 31, to 26 industries out 01 a sampIe of 33. 7 Even for
the last years this is less than what has been observed for the V.S.,
where wages in nearly all the industries are reported to deviate signif-
icantly from the industry average. However, this small difference in
the findings for West Germany and the V.S. may partly have a tech-
nical reason.
One basic assumption ofthe F-test is equal error variances in the
different subsampIes. In this case the probability of rejecting a true
hypothesis is minimized. But in the case ofheteroscedasticity the true
level of significance always becomes larger than the nominal level
presupposedunderhomoscedasticity [Toyoda, 1974]. AlthoughToyo-
da's quantitative results have been shown to be generally too pes-
simistic about the effect ofheteroscedasticity on the F-test, his quali-
tative result about the true level ofsignificance, especially in the case
ofequal and small subsampIe sizes, is worthconsidering [Schmidt and
Sickles, 1977]. With respect to ourresults this implies thatwith hetero-
scedasticity the "true" F-value for the 5percent level will be some-
what lower than indicated by the F-table. Therefore, judged by the
F-test an increase in the number ofindustries whose wage and salary
structure statistically differs from the industry average is the likely
outcome if heteroscedasticity is present.
Our results for the Breusch-Pagan test 8 for heteroscedasticity (see
"q"in Table 2) confirm this expectation. Foreach year there are some
industries where the estimated F-value may be small only because of
unequal error terms in the two regression subsets 9 implying that the
hypothesis of no interindustry wage differences has to be rejected
more frequently than indicated at the presented 5percent level. This
finding brings us closer to the reported V.S. result in terms of the
number ofindustries whose wages deviate significantly from the aver-
age industry wage.
Our results suggest that on average a high (low)-wage industry is
a high (low)-wage industry for all qualification groups ofemployees.
In that case, the correlation ofaverage industry wages and qualifica-
tion-specific wages should be rather strong. As reported for the V.S.,
the correlationcoefficient between the interindustrywage differentials
estimated with and without labor-quality controlvariables is 0.95 [see
7 An increase in the interindustry wage differentials especially in manufacturing indus-
tries has also been reported for the U.S. since 1970 [Bell and Freeman, 1985].
8 Breusch and Pagan [1979]; see Judge et al. [1982] and Johnston [1984] for a textbook
version.
9 Precision mechanics and glass are examples for the year 1986.Fels/Gundlach: Interindustry Wage Differentials
Table 2 - F-Test Results on Interindustry Wage Differentials
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Industry F q F q F q
1986 1982 1980
Mining 25.47* 17.11+ 28.75* 11.51 30.83* 10.83
Stone and clay 1.01 2.92 1.32 9.72 1.22 5.08
Iron and steel 12.46* 1.11 5.61* 9.28 4.14* 11.27+
Nonferrous metals 12.28* 18.94+ 1.31 12.31 + 4.91 * 17.88+
Chemicals 21.82* 2.45 13.36* 3.04 14.30* 3.84
Petroleum 54.79* 4.31 60.07* 0.49 57.13* 1.07
Rubber 0.83 10.09 1.23 12.71 + 2.11 10.03
Lumber 7.05* 4.74 4.75* 1.80 4.66* 11.03
Pulp, paper, paperboard 7.64* 9.37 4.45* 6.87 3.89* 3.42
Structural engineering 2.33 2.41 0.55 7.33 1.46 15.39+
Machinery, exc. electrical 3.60* 23.66+ 1.24 12.24+ 1.48 13.26+
Computer equipment 6.18* 7.76 2.74 10.58 2.55 7.82
Motor vehicles and equipment 55.12* 8.01 20.00* 4.58 31.01 * 7.26
Ship building 1.79 9.53 0.82 9.20 0.75 6.16
Aircraft 4.76* 6.01 5.34* 3.28 4.91 * 1.91
Electrical engineering 3.93* 11.39 0.76 18.71 + 1.00 10.62
Precision mechanics, optics 0.91 21.79+ 0.58 11.92 0.51 13.25+
Metal products 1.04 4.40 1.63 7.33 1.07 7.10
Precision ceramics 15.22* 7.32 4.51* 13.56+ 1.73 9.66
Glass 1.97 15.27+ 1.99 17.12+ 2.06 14.22+
Fumiture 3.44* 10.80 3.24* 10.17 2.24 16.67+
Musical instruments, toys, jewelry 9.93* 13.67+ 5.26* 4.61 5.95* 3.13
Paper and paperboard products 10.93* 10.20 7.89* 10.37 15.22* 13.88+
Printing 6.32* 17.79+ 3.49* 8.84 3.67* 9.01
Plastics products 5.58* 14.18+ 5.91 * 16.23+ 4.65* 20.76+
Leather 11.53* 5.58 3.89* 3.75 7.07* 9.25
Leather products 36.63* 1.19 40.26* 2.05 7.80* 2.14
Footwear 10.58* 1.69 7.10* 3.45 11.48* 4.19
Textiles 7.52* 7.63 15.74* 7.00 15.99* 5.97
Apparel 17.65* 3.69 19.94* 5.27 18.59* 4.77
Food, beverages, tobacco 8.91 * 17.51 + 3.94* 14.21 + 7.02* 15.55+
Construction 29.52* 31.17+ 5.30* 25.19+ 5.04* 16.48+
Public utilities 7.99* 4.78 6.93* 4.74 6.86* 4.00
Number ofindustries deviating
from the industry average 26 22 21
(Table continued on next page)
Krueger and Summers, 1987, p.19; Katz and Summers, 1989, p. 218].
We try a similar, though weaker test with the West German data. In
a cross-section analysis we correlate the average blue-collar worker
wages with the blue-collarworker wages for the different qualification
groups, and we use the same procedure for the white-collar worker552
(Table 2 continued)
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Industry F q F q F q
1975 1970 1960
Mining 17.15* 11.35 2.01 33.65+ 17.66* 8.90
Stone and clay 0.70 10.06 0.81 24.70+ 1.38 10.67
Iron and steel 2.74 14.39+ 3.67* 10.31 3.80* 4.99
Nonferrous metals 1.88 16.08+ 1.64 22.09+ 1.07 12.58+
Chemicals 9.81 * 3.05 13.39* 7.23 3.82* 20.88+
Petroleum 44.98* 1.26 42.35* 1.41 10.47* 8.49
Rubber 2.21 15.89 + 5.02* 7.77 7.84* 5.14
Lumber 5.43* 4.64 4.20* 11.39 14.33* 8.09
Pulp, paper, paperboard 1.76 18.62+ 4.17* 14.41 + 2.08 8.76
Structural engineering 2.67 9.19 2.40 8.39 0.64 2.87
Machinery, exc. electrical 1.17 10.22 0.76 17.43+ 2.17 14.49+
Computer equipment 1.57 8.24 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Motor vehicles and equipment 24.29* 6.70 7.88* 7.18 6.38* 14.71 +
Ship building 2.18 7.17 0.65 9.49 1.41 6.13
Aircraft 3.22* 4.86 3.13* 13.55+ n.a. n.a.
Electrical engineering 0.96 1.94 1.97 6.72 0.85 4.43
Precision mechanics, optics 2.62 9.27 1.34 8.95 1.72 3.69
Metal products 1.38 6.37 1.68 0.99 0.15 9.54
Precision ceramics 2.71 11.61 3.28* 7.37 1.01 11.79
Glass 1.77 5.76 0.74 29.90+ 0.72 8.71
Fumiture 3.42* 6.76 3.23* 6.54 26.47* 6.66
Musical instruments, toys, jewelry 1.84 3.37 11.87* 9.91 10.68* 7.17
Paper and paperboard products 9.28* 10.63 3.35* 15.37+ 2.17 13.16+
Printing 3.20* 14.25+ 4.71 * 11.22 2.47 3.17
Plastics products 4.09* 5.28 1.90 14.88+ 1.66 5.08
Leather 3.59* 3.07 2.14 8.74 7.10* 7.85
Leather products 16.57* 1.96 10.26* 6.20 4.43* 8.53
Footwear 9.64* 3.65 7.00* 15.95+ 3.85* 53.27+
Textiles 3.66* 3.02 2.67 13.24+ 2.23 16.90+
Apparel 18.61 * 3.78 17.88* 3.62 6.09* 2.95
Food, beverages, tobacco 5.24* 15.32+ 4.20* 37.71 + 2.20 43.98+
Construction 2.83 32.88+ 1.25 9.20 20.77* 27.42+
Public utilities 19.06* 3.40 11.13* 9.38 3.20* 5.13
Number ofindustries deviating
from the industry average 17 18 15
Nole: Classification according to the German wage and salary statistic. - F =esti-
mated F-value. q= Breusch-Pagan test results for heteroscedasticity. *=statis-
tically significant deviation from the interindustry average wages and salaries at
the 5 percent level. +=rejection of homoscedasticity at the 5 percent level.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [a; b]; own calculations.
salaries (Table 3). In contrast to the wide range of control variables
used in the D.S. studies, which apriori allow a low or no correlation
to be expected, it is more likely to find some correlation in our dataFels/Gundlach: Interindustry Wage Differentials




Blue-collar worker wages White-collar worker salaries
aver- group group group aver- group group group group
age
b 1 2 3 age




b 1.00 0.94 0.91 0.75 x x x x x
group 1 0.91 1.00 0.88 0.70 x 0.84 0.82 0.65 0.64
group 2 0.94 0.88 1.00 0.86 x 0.72 0.75 0.51 0.56




b x x x x 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.85 0.71
group 2 x 0.78 0.74 0.62 0.88 1.00 0.89 0.74 0.55
group 3 x 0.80 0.78 0.71 0.94 0.94 1.00 0.83 0.61
group 4 x 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.92 0.85 0.92 1.00 0.75
group 5 x 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.85 0.67 0.72 0.88 1.00
a The figures in the upper triangle (in italics) refer to men, those in the lower
triangle to women. - b Unweighted average.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [a; b]; own calculations.
because we correlate an average wage (salary) with one ofits compo-
nents. Therefore, we should at least find a similarly high correlation
coefficient, if the underlying hypothesis of substantial interindustry
wage differentials even after controlling for a number of variables
(where qualification and sex may be the most important) is also true
for West Germany.
Our results cast some doubt on this consideration. Firstly, the
correlationcoefficients are lower thanexpected. Secondly, the correla-
tion coefficients for high qualification groups are higher than the
correlation coefficients for low qualification groups. This pattern
emerges for bothrnen and wornen and for white-collarworkers as weIl
as for blue-collar workers (see the colums and rows entitled "aver-
age").
Furtherrnore, directly correlating the wages and salaries of the
different qualification groups with each otherreveals that ourhypoth-
esis that wage and salary levels between industries differ across all
qualification groups rnay be somewhat overstated. All qualification554 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
groups are significantly correlated with each other in a statistical
sense, but the degree of correlation substantially declines the more
different the qualification groups are (Table 3). 10 This means that
there is no uniform pattern in the interindustry wages and salaries of
our set ofdata. Notevery high (low)-wage industry seems to pay high
(low) wages for all qualification groups. It is tempting to conclude
from these results that interindustry qualification and sex differences
ofthe employees explain more ofthe interindustry wage variation in
West Germanythaninthe DnitedStates. Followingneoclassicallabor
market theory one would have expected just the opposite result given
Germany's labor market institutions and the high degree of labor
market regulations on the one hand and given the high mobility and
the low degree of unionization in the D.S. labor market on the
other. 11 However, this interpretation is subject to a strong caveat.
So far, we have neglected an important aspect in ourdiscussion of
theinterindustrywage structure, namely theemploymentshares ofthe
different qualification groups. Table 4 offers two insights. Firstly, the
structure ofthe skill pattern ofindustrial employment did notchange
between 1973 and 1986; the correlation coefficient ofthese skill pat-
terns is 0.98. Secondly, the employees of four qualification groups
account for more than 70 percent and male workers account for some
80 percent of total industrial employment.
Especially the second point is important for the interpretation of
our results because industrial employment is apparently concentrated
on skilled and specialized male workers. In other words, industry-
specific wages and salaries for unskilled workers and for women in
general may partly reflect regional wage and salary variation due to
their small employment share. That is, lhe probability for a specific
wage or salary in a given industry to reflect regional labor market
conditions increases as the employment share ofthis specific wage or
salary group declines. If we accept this hypothesis the implications
with respect to our findings are twofold.
Firstly, our finding of a relatively small correlation coefficient
between the wages (salaries) of more distant qualification groups
indicates the presence ofthe regional variation effect. Formale work-
ers, for example, the lowest correlation coefficients are found for the
10 In contrast to this finding Dickens and Katz [1987b, p. 9] report "...1arge correla-
tions between average wages in any two occupations within an industry" for private
sector non-union workers in the D.S.
11 For an account ofthe inflexibilities ofthe West German labor market see Soltwedel
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Table 4 - Percentage Shares ofDifferent Qualification Groups
in Total Industrial Employment
a
, 1973 and 1986
1973 1986
Blue-collar workers 75.8 70.7
rnen group 1 31.4 33.9
rnen group 2 20.2 18.2
rnen group 3 7.7 5.3
wornen group 1 1.0 0.8
wornen group 2 7.7 5.8
wornen group 3 7.9 6.7
White-collar workers 24.2 29.3
rnen group 2 6.0 9.7
rnen group 3 8.8 10.1
rnen group 4 2.1 1.8
rnen group 5 0.2 0.1
wornen group 2 0.4 0.7
wornen group 3 2.7 3.4
wornen group 4 3.4 3.3
wornen group 5 0.6 0.4
Note: wornen total 23.7 21.0
a Mining, rnanufacturing, construction, and public utilities.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [a; b]; own calculations.
white-collar groups 4 and 5 (see Table 3), and these groups show the
lowest employment share for male workers (see Table 4). Therefore,
one can speculate that the correlation coefficients between more dis-
tant wage and salary groups would be'higher in the absence of the
regional variation effect in the data. Secondly, the number ofindus-
tries whose wages and salaries deviate significantly from the industry
average for all qualification groups (see Table 2) would presumably
increase ifthe test procedure were able to control for regional varia-
tion effects.
To sum up, if the existence of the supposed regional variation
effects is accepted, our results for West Germany are in line with two
basic hypotheses: the West German and the D.S. interindustry wage
structures are remarkably similar, and high (low)-wage industries are
high (low)-wage industries for all qualification groups.556 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
111. Qualifications and Outlook
One ean attempt to rationalize this interindustry wage pattern in
the framework of the standard eompetitive model in two ways.
Firstly, the interindustry differenees in wages for workers with similar
eharaeteristies may be neeessary to eompensate for differenees in
working eonditions. In this ease the international similarity of in-
terindustry wage struetures would be no surprise. But ifthe observed
wage premia were merely eompensating payments for harderworking
eonditions, then we would expeet quit rates in the high-wage indus-
tries to be about as high as in the low-wage industries. However, the
empirieal evidenee for the V.S. suggests that quit rates and labor-
quality adjusted industry wage differentials are negatively eorrelated
[Katz and Summers, 1989]; that is, workers in high-wage industries
are less inelined to quit than workers in low-wage industries. There-
fore, industrywage premiums seem to refleet rents to "good"jobs and
are notmerely eompensating payments. Furthermore, while it may be
reasonable to expeet large differenees in working eonditions for some
oeeupational groups aeross industries, it is unlikely that these large
differenees exist for all other employee groups (e.g., seeretaries or
janitors) as weIl. But oureorrelation results (Table 3) pointjustto this
phenomenon. Ifone oeeupational group in an industry is highly paid
relative to the industry average, all eategories of workers in that
industry tend to be highly paid. Thus eompensating wage differentials
offer no overall explanation ofthe observed interindustry wage pat-
tern.
A seeond and more promising way to rationalize the observed
wage differentials within the framework ofthe eompetitive model is to
aceount for worker's abilities not eaptured by the available data.
Obviously, the available eontrols for differenees in worker's abilities
are not exhaustive in our set of data for West Germany, to say the
least. Therefore, itis reasonable to expeet interindustry wage differen-
tials following from unobserved produetivity differenees between
workers of the same broad qualifieation group. For the V.S. the
empiriealevidenee onunobserved labor-qualitydifferenees is ambigu-
ous, however. Some researehers find it very diffieult to attribute in-
terindustry wage differenees to unobserved labor-quality differenees
[Krueger and Summers, 1988; Gibbons and Katz, 1989; Katz and
Summers, 1989]. Others argue that produetivity-based sorting is an
important determinant of interindustry wage differenees, sinee it is
plausible that observable and unobservable ability measures are pos-Fels/Gundlach: Interindustry Wage Differentials 557
itively correlated and controlling for the observable ability variables
reduces the magnitude of the interindustry wage variations [Topei,
1989; Murphy and Topei, 1987]. Buteven the existence ofunobserved
abilities cannot explain the large correlations between wages in any
two qualification groups.
So far, the most prominent candidate among alternative ap-
proaches explaining the interindustry wage differentials is the effi-
ciency wage theory.12 Its basic hypothesis is that the productivity of
workers is a function ofthe wage paid. Thus, it may be profitable for
firms to raise wages above market-clearing levels in order to increase
workers' effort. Since the relationship between productivity and wages
may differ between industries, profit-maximizing behavior by firms
may lead to wage differentials between industries. Stiglitz [1986] cate-
gorizes five versions of the efficiency wage model, each featuring a
different reason why higher wages may increase effort. But only one
type ofefficiency wage models - namely sociological models based on
workers' fairness considerations - may be compatible with the empir-
ical evidence because all the other versions cannot account for the
previously-mentioned high correlations between the wages ofany two
qualification groups within an industry. In the sociological models
productivity is assumed to depend on workers' perceptions as to
whether they are being paid fairly. Perceived fairness in turn depends
on firms' characteristics like production technologies and monopoly
rents. These characteristics differ between industries and may thus
explain wage differentials. Infact, Dickens and Katz [1987a] find that
wage premia are positively correlated with profits and the capital-
intensity ofproduction, while Kahneman et al. [1986] present empirical
evidence that fairness considerations influence the behavior of firms
in setting prices and wages. In addition, it is possible to combine the
fairness models with otherefficiency wage models. Forexample, some
workers in specific industries may be able to exert much damage to
their firm by shirking. Thus, they may receive high wages in order to
prevent them from doing so. That is, the costs ofshirking may differ
between industries due to industry-specific production technologies.
Internal fairness considerations may then lead to high wages for all
workers in industries with production costs sensitive to potential
shirking.
12 For surveys of efficiency wage models see Yellen [1984], Stiglitz [1986], and Katz
[1986].558 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
Interpretations like these are robust with respect to the available
datacited so far, although they are notnecessarily exclusive. All these
more or less theoretical considerations are waiting for an empirical
test, at least for West Germany. Testing these hypotheses seems to be
an important task for further research since an explanation of the
observed interindustry wage pattern within the framework of effi-
ciency wage models would have far-reaching consequences for eco-
nomic policy prescriptions regarding the labor market.
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* * *
Zusammenfassung: Mehr Evidenz zur interindustriellen Lohnstruktur in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. - Die Verfasser zeigen, daß in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland für Arbeitskräfte mit ähnlichen Qualifikationsmerkmalen branchenspezi-
fische Lohnunterschiede existieren und daß die interindustrielle Lohnstruktur in der
Bundesrepublik der interindustriellen Lohnstruktur in den Vereinigten Staaten gleicht.
So sind der Straßenfahrzeugbau und die Mineralölverarbeitung in beiden Ländern
typische Hochlohnbranchen, das Bekleidungsgewerbe und das Ledergewerbe dagegen
typische Niedriglohnbranchen. Diese Ähnlichkeit der interindustriellen Lohnstruk-
turen muß überraschen, da sich die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen des Arbeits-
marktes in beiden Ländern sehr stark unterscheiden. Darüber hinaus zeigt sich, daß im
Branchenquerschnitt die Verdienste von Beschäftigten mit unterschiedlicher Quali-
fikation eng miteinander korreliert sind. Diese Ergebnisse sind nicht ohne weiteres mit
den herkömmlichen neoklassischen Arbeitsmarktmodellen zu vereinbaren.
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Resume: Plus d'evidence des differences inter-industrielles de salaire: Le cas de
la RFA. - Cette etude represente l'evidence empirique de l'existence des differences
inter-industrielles de salaire pourles ouvriers avec des qualifications similaires en RFA.
La structure de salaire inter-industriel en RFA semble cl celle aux Etats Unis. Danstous
les deux pays ce sont l'industrie d'automobiles et les raffineries de petrol qui ont un
typiquement haut niveau de salaire, tandis que les industries des textiles et de cuir ont
un niveau bas. La similarite des structures inter-industrielles de salaire est un puzzle
parceque ces deux pays ontdes institutionscompletementdifferentes en ce qui conceme
le marche du travail. De plus, on a trouve des correlations fortes de salaire entre aucun
de deux groupes d'ouvriers qualifies sur toutes les branches en RFA. Ces resultats sont
un defi pour les theories neoclassiques du marche du travail.
*
Resumen: Mas evidencia empirica sobre el rompecabezas de las diferencias
salariales interindustriales en Alemania Occidental. - En este trabajo se presenta evi-
dencia empirica sobre la existencia de diferencias interindustriales en el nivel de salarios
para trabajadores con calificaci6n similar en Alemania Occidental. La estructura in-
terindustrial de salarios de Alemania Occidental presenta el mismo perfil que la de los
EE UU. En ambos paises las ramas de salarios altos comunmente son las de vehiculos
y refinaci6n de petr6leo, mientras que las ramas de salarios mas bajos incluyen las de
lavestimenta ycuero. Lasimilitud de las estructuras interindustriales de ingresos indica
la existencia de un rompecabezas, debido a que estos paises exhiben un marco institu-
cional parael mercado laboral totalmente diferente. Ademas, se encuentra una correla-
ci6n alta entre los salarios de dos grupos cualesquiera de trabajadores calificados
pertenecientes a una misma industria. Estos resultados constituyen un reto a las teorias
neoclasicas tradicionales deI mercado laboral.